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LAW AND FACT IN CONTEMPORARY 
FEDERAL CIVIL LITIGATION 
Elizabeth M. Schneider* 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2004, Steve Subrin and Thomas Main published an article with an intri-
guing title: The Integration of Law and Fact in an Uncharted Parallel Proce-
dural Universe.1 It has always been one of my favorite Subrin articles and was 
published in a volume honoring David Shapiro. So I want to carry on this tradi-
tion for this volume honoring Subrin’s important contributions to procedure 
scholarship. I want to revisit many of the issues raised in that article, in light of 
new developments over the last ten years, along with Subrin and Main’s most 
recent work, The Fourth Era of American Civil Procedure.2 
Steve Subrin is one of the few civil procedure scholars who has closely an-
alyzed the integration of law and fact.3 Parallel Procedural Universe criticizes 
traditional litigation under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP” or 
“the Rules”) and argues that the formal litigation process does not adequately 
provide for the integration of law and fact. Subrin and Main look at what they 
called the “uncharted parallel procedural universe” of litigation statements and 
demand letters that are “outside” but “parallel” to the formal litigation system. 
They argue that these documents do a better job of integrating law and fact than 
the formal litigation process. They also do empirical research interviewing 
lawyers and examining “parallel universe” documents, which is fascinating. 
                                                        
*  Rose L. Hoffer Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. An earlier version of this essay 
was presented at the Symposium, Through A Glass Starkly: Civil Procedure Reassessed, 
honoring the scholarship of Professor Stephen N. Subrin at Northeastern University Law 
School, April 11–12, 2014. Thanks to participants in the Symposium and the Brooklyn Law 
School Summer Faculty Workshop for helpful comments, Claire Gavin, Brooklyn Law 
School ’16 for excellent research assistance, and students in my Civil Procedure and Federal 
Civil Litigation, Public Law and Justice classes who have helped me explore these issues. 
Thanks also to the Brooklyn Law School Faculty Research Program for generous support. 
1  Stephen N. Subrin & Thomas O. Main, The Integration of Law and Fact in an Uncharted 
Parallel Procedural Universe, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1981 (2004). 
2  Stephen N. Subrin & Thomas O. Main, The Fourth Era of American Civil Procedure, 162 
U. PA. L. REV. 1839 (2014). 
3  See, e.g., Phyllis Tropper Baumann, Judith Olans Brown & Stephen N. Subrin, Substance 
in the Shadow of Procedure: The Integration of Substantive and Procedural Law in Title VII 
Cases, 33 B.C. L. REV. 211, 243–52 (1992). 
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The interrelationship between law and fact should be a crucial and founda-
tional issue in legal scholarship, legal education, and legal advocacy. Yet, there 
is little scholarship that focuses on the distinctions and interrelationship be-
tween law and fact, and it is under-theorized. I think many law teachers and le-
gal scholars take it for granted; perhaps it is viewed as “old school,” “obvious,” 
and “should not have to be spelled out.” There is also little focus on how law 
and fact are integrated in legal advocacy. This absence is especially problemat-
ic in civil procedure scholarship and teaching, but in many other areas as well. 
In my own teaching of civil procedure, always in the first semester of law 
school, I emphasize the constant back and forth process between law and fact 
that lawyers must understand. If law students do not get this crucial insight, it is 
difficult for them to understand what they are doing for the next three years, 
and what they will be doing as lawyers. I also emphasize the distinctions be-
tween law and fact, central to so many areas of procedure, as I have detailed 
elsewhere.4 
In this essay, I reassess the critique that Subrin and Main made of the for-
mal procedural system in failing to integrate fact and law. I also look at this cri-
tique in light of recent judicial decisions, rule-making, and scholarly develop-
ments. I conclude that there are now even more hurdles to the integration of 
law and fact in the formal procedural system. Integration of law and fact in the 
formal procedural system is now further abbreviated, fractured, random, and 
piecemeal. Procedural opportunities for narrative that combine both law and 
fact are fast disappearing because of Supreme Court decisions, rulemaking ef-
forts, and the ways in which judges are making decisions. 
I. INTEGRATION OF LAW AND FACT: THE FORMAL PROCEDURAL SYSTEM 
In Parallel Procedural Universe, Subrin and Main explain that, within civil 
litigation, two different systems are at work procedurally. “One of these is the 
formal system of procedural rules and doctrine that govern pleadings and mo-
tion practice in state or federal courts. The other system has no procedural rule-
book, is largely ignored in law schools, and is seldom mentioned by judges.”5 
The second is “the universe of correspondence and other materials that 
flow between adversaries but seldom appear in the pleadings, motions, or other 
                                                        
4  See Elizabeth M. Schneider & Nancy Gertner, “Only Procedural”: Thoughts on the Sub-
stantive Law Dimensions of Preliminary Procedural Decisions in Employment Discrimina-
tion Cases, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 767, 768–69 (2012–13) [hereinafter Schneider & 
Gertner, Only Procedural]; Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Changing Shape of Federal Civil 
Pretrial Practice: The Disparate Impact on Civil Rights and Employment Discrimination 
Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 517, 530 & n.59 (2010) [hereinafter Schneider, Changing Shape]; 
Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dangers of Summary Judgment: Gender and Federal Civil Lit-
igation, 59 RUTGERS L. REV. 705, 718 (2007) [hereinafter Schneider, Dangers of Summary 
Judgment]. 
5  Subrin & Main, supra note 1, at 1983. 
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papers contemplated, ordered or even received by any formal procedural sys-
tem.”6 Subrin and Main note: 
We have observed that many civil litigators, particularly those representing 
plaintiffs, seem to find it both desirable and necessary (in order to achieve opti-
mum results for their clients) to prepare various written documents, notebooks, 
and even videos containing narratives that integrate the law and facts of their 
cases in ways that may persuade their relevant audiences—the opposing lawyer, 
the opposing lawyer’s client, their own client, insurance companies, and media-
tors. These advocacy materials appear in myriad forms, including demand let-
ters, other settlement correspondence, notebooks, mediation statements, edifying 
brochures, and documentary videos. . . . Although we recognize that pleadings, 
motions and other papers filed with courts may occasionally contain integrated 
narratives of law and fact, we were intrigued because the procedural rules of the 
formal system seldom require it.7 
Subrin and Main argue that this “dichotomy” between the formal procedur-
al system and the “uncharted parallel procedural universe” creates “an interest-
ing challenge for federal practice and procedure in the new century.”8 They re-
view the opportunities for integration of law and fact in the formal procedural 
system, find them wanting, and recognize the need for lawyers to develop al-
ternative methods of integrating law and fact to different audiences, such as 
their adversaries, rather than judges. In the new “settlement culture” of federal 
civil litigation, in which cases mostly settle and are not tried, these audiences 
may be more important than judges. 
In the formal procedural system, there are four main stages of litigation 
that are traditionally recognized as providing opportunities for the integration 
of law and fact: the complaint, including the 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss on the 
sufficiency of the complaint; discovery; motion for summary judgment; and tri-
al. Sadly, trial—the greatest opportunity to tell the story of the case in a way 
that integrates fact and law—is virtually out of the picture in contemporary fed-
eral civil litigation.9 In the other three contexts, as I argue below, not only do 
the Rules not require the integration between law and fact, but also application 
of the Rules does not provide opportunities for such integration, which is now 
more difficult. Without the likelihood of trial, the pressure on these other early 
litigation stages to provide some integration of law and fact is more crucial, 
though increasingly elusive. 
                                                        
6  Id. 
7  Id. at 1983–84 (footnotes omitted). 
8  Id. at 1983. 
9  See Stephen B. Burbank, Keeping Our Ambition Under Control: The Limits of Data and 
Inference in Searching for the Causes and Consequences of Vanishing Trials in Federal 
Court, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 571, 572–73 (2004); Stephen B. Burbank, Vanishing 
Trials and Summary Judgment in Federal Civil Cases: Drifting Toward Bethlehem or Go-
morrah?, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 591, 592–94 (2004). 
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A. Pleading10 
In the complaint, the plaintiff must set out both law and fact. The facts are 
set out first, and then the legal claims that the pleaders believe are invoked by 
the facts in a “plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled 
to relief.”11 The complaint will be tested by the defendant through a 12(b)(6) 
motion to dismiss.12 The complaint is evaluated as to whether it is legally suffi-
cient, but that has been understood to involve both legal and factual determina-
tions.13 
Until 2007, modern pleading rules described the standards for evaluating 
complaints as the standard of “notice pleading.”14 Under Conley v. Gibson, 
dismissals under Rule 12(b)(6) required that when considering whether a plead-
ing states a claim upon whether relief can be granted, “a complaint should not 
be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the 
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle 
him to relief.”15 In effect, the litigation was supposed to continue even if the 
plaintiff’s allegations did not seem credible to the judge or were unlikely to be 
proven. The standard was a forgiving one, in contrast to the ponderous common 
law pleading system it replaced.16 
All that changed with Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly17 and later Ashcroft 
v. Iqbal.18 With Twombly, the Supreme Court underscored that the governing 
approach was whether the allegations were “plausible,” and that the plain 
statement “possess enough heft to show that the pleader is entitled to relief.”19 
In order to avoid falling “short of the line between possibility and plausibility,” 
complaints must have “further factual enhancement.”20 In Iqbal, the Court reit-
erated the “plausibility standard” and held that the evaluation of the plausibility 
of complaints was a “context-specific task” in which judges were to “draw on 
[their] judicial experience and common sense.”21 
On a motion to dismiss, the judicial process of evaluation now involves 
more than determining whether the pleading is consistent with liability, an ap-
proach that required nothing more than a rational examination of the complaint 
                                                        
10  Substantial portions of this Part appeared first in Schneider & Gertner, Only Procedural, 
supra note 4, at 772–74. 
11  FED. R. CIV. P. 8. 
12  FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). 
13  See Schneider & Gertner, Only Procedural, supra note 4, at 773–75. 
14  Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47–48 (1957). 
15  Id. at 45–46. 
16  Alexander A. Reinert, The Costs of Heightened Pleading, 86 IND. L.J. 119, 127–29 
(2011). 
17  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
18  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
19  Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556–57 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
20  Id. at 557. 
21  Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79. 
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by measuring the factual allegations to see if they fit the legal claims. Now, dis-
trict judges have been told to ask whether alternative explanations for the 
events complained of are “more likely” than the allegations.22 In light of the 
sparse legal or factual record on which district court judges would be making a 
decision to dismiss the complaint, this has been viewed as an invitation for the 
exercise of judicial subjectivity, for judges to “fill in the gaps” of the truncated 
legal and factual record with what “they know” or more significantly, what 
they think they know.23 
But there is a more fundamental problem. Although much of the scholarly 
and practitioner literature that has discussed the implications of Twombly and 
Iqbal for plaintiffs has interpreted the mandate of these cases as requiring 
greater “fact pleading,” the judicial determination of plausibility is obviously 
both law- and fact-dependent. After these cases, the complaint now has to bear 
the brunt of a much heightened analysis on both fronts. Complaints are not the 
place for elaborate factual narratives, much less nuanced legal arguments. To 
meet the new demands of Iqbal and Twombly, law and facts now have to be 
wedged into a document that has traditionally been viewed to be very basic and 
in many instances is ill-suited for this kind of review. 
Rule 12(b)(6) motions are now filed in almost every case and present a co-
nundrum for judges. Since federal judges recognize that this is a preliminary 
stage, some judges will allow amendments of pleadings or early pre-dismissal 
discovery in order to assess the claims and determine whether or not they 
should go forward.24 But many are dismissing claims outright. 
Scholars who have analyzed district court determinations of motions to 
dismiss the complaint post-Iqbal suggest that 12(b)(6) decisions are now for-
mulaic.25 If the complaint invokes the “magic words” that spell out the factual 
elements of a claim in a way that is recognizable to the judge, and the judge be-
lieves that the claim is “plausible,” the judge will allow the case to proceed. Al-
ternatively, the judge will dismiss the case because of a lack of “factual speci-
ficity” and “conclusory allegations.”26 The law is rarely mentioned, unless there 
is a specific legal requirement on which the plaintiff is basing her claim that 
does not have a “factual hook” in the complaint. The judge is necessarily apply-
ing the law as she understands it, in her assessment of the facts, in her under-
standing of which facts are salient and which are not, in her determination of 
what may or may not be proof in the case. Thus, at this early stage, the judge is 
                                                        
22  See id. at 680. 
23  See Schneider & Gertner, Only Procedural, supra note 4, at 773. 
24  Id. at 774. 
25  Raymond H. Brescia, The Iqbal Effect: The Impact of New Pleading Standards in Em-
ployment and Housing Discrimination Litigation, 100 KY. L.J. 235, 278–79, 284–87 (2011); 
Reinert, supra note 16, at 120–27, 161–69. 
26  See Schneider & Gertner, Only Procedural, supra note 4, at 774. 
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ruling on the law implicit in the complaint, often without any explicit law or 
nuanced legal argument to go on.27 
B. Discovery 
Historically, the concept of notice pleading in the FRCP was premised on 
the centrality of discovery to elaborate facts. Pleading could be limited and just 
give notice to the other party of the basic facts and nature of the legal claims 
because the facts would be filled out in discovery, and then the legal conse-
quences of those facts could be developed and tested on summary judgment. 
The Supreme Court was explicit in Twombly that the new heightened pleading 
standard was adopted in order to end cases and omit the need for discovery, es-
pecially in cases against corporate defendants.28 Accordingly, the Supreme 
Court is encouraging district judges to dismiss cases on 12(b)(6) motions, on 
the hope that these cases will not make it to discovery. 
Even if cases do make it to discovery, discovery is now likely to be more 
limited. The Advisory Committee on the FRCP recently proposed some very 
drastic changes in discovery. The proposals have wended their way through the 
rulemaking process, were approved by the Standing Committee,29 and have just 
been adopted by the Supreme Court.30 These proposals amend the discovery 
rules to require that the district court rule on the proportionality of the discov-
ery at an early stage, and originally proposed limits on the FRCP with respect 
to methods of discovery. There has been a huge outcry to these proposals by 
lawyers and law professors.31 This proportionality determination is problemat-
ic, since it puts the judge in a position to have to make an early evaluation on 
the merits of the case, without any real factual or legal development, or integra-
tion thereof, as part of the proportionality determination. 
                                                        
27  See id. 
28  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558–60 (2007). 
29  Patricia W. Moore, Standing Committee Approves Proposed FRCP Amendments, CIV. 
PROC. & FED. CTS. BLOG (June 7, 2014), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/civpro 
/2014/06/standing-committee-approves-proposed-frcp-amendments.html. 
30  Letters to Hon. John A Boehner & Hon. Joseph R. Biden from Chief Justice John G. Rob-
erts, submitting to Congress the FRCP Amendments Adopted by the Supreme Court of the 
United States, April 29, 2015., available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders 
/courtorders/frcv15(update)_1823.pdf. 
31  See Joint Comments by Professors Helen Hershkoff, Lonny Hoffman, Alexander A. 
Reinert, Elizabeth M. Schneider, David L. Shapiro, & Adam N. Steinman on Proposed 
Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, submitted to the Committee on Rules of 
Practice and Procedure, (Feb. 5, 2014), available at http://www.afj.org/wp-content 
/uploads/2014/02/Professors-Joint-Comment.pdf (signed by 170 additional law professors); 
Email from Erika Duthely, Alliance for Justice, to author (Feb. 20, 2014) (on file with au-
thor). 
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C. Summary Judgment 
Historically, Rule 5632 is the major place in the pretrial process where fact 
and law are both distinguished and need to be integrated. Summary judgment 
requires the movant to show that there are no genuine issues of material fact 
and that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.33 The Supreme Court 
hopes that district judges will dismiss at the pleading stage, but if discovery is 
conducted and the case does not settle, defendants will likely move for sum-
mary judgment. 
Historically, summary judgment was a disfavored motion in the federal 
court, with trial as the preferred method of resolution, but that has dramatically 
changed. Prior to Iqbal and Twombly, I examined the problems and dangers of 
summary judgment,34 as did many other procedure scholars.35 Now, the oppor-
tunity for plaintiffs to even reach summary judgment looks like a win. 
But any nostalgia for summary judgment obscures the continuing difficul-
ties that judges have with summary judgment. As I have argued, both in my 
scholarship and comments to the Civil Rules Committee, summary judgment 
poses an incredible intellectual challenge for judges on this very issue of inte-
gration of fact and law. District judges make serious errors as they slice and 
dice, mixing law with facts. They do not take a careful, holistic view of the en-
tire record and rely too often on the motions and briefs of movants and non-
movants.36 The structure of summary judgment presentations are not as bad as 
they could have been, because a mandatory point/counterpoint proposal was 
ultimately rejected by the Advisory Committee (after an outcry by lawyers and 
judges). The proposal would have required the movant to structure and limit the 
presentation and not allowed the non-movant to present its narrative view of the 
case.37 But some districts have point/counterpoint local rules.38 Law clerks 
                                                        
32  FED. R. CIV. P. 56. 
33  Id. 
34  Schneider, Dangers of Summary Judgment, supra note 4, at 710–13. 
35  Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Distorted Mirror: The Supreme Court’s Shimmering View of Sum-
mary Judgment, Directed Verdict, and the Adjudication Process, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 95, 96–99 
(1988); see also Patricia M. Wald, Summary Judgment at Sixty, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1897 (1998). 
36  See, e.g., Schneider & Gertner, Only Procedural, supra note 4, at 773–75. 
37  See Schneider, Changing Shape, supra note 4, at 521, 557–61. 
38  See, e.g., S.D. Fla. R. 56.1(a) (“Statements of material facts submitted in opposition to a 
motion for summary judgment shall correspond with the order and with the paragraph num-
bering scheme used by the movant . . .”); N.D. Ga. Civ. R. 56.1(B)(2)(a)(1) (“A respondent 
to a summary judgment motion shall include the following documents with the responsive 
brief: A response to the movant’s statement of undisputed facts. This response shall contain 
individually numbered, concise, nonargumentative responses corresponding to each of the 
movant’s numbered undisputed material facts.”); E.D. Wash. R. 561.(b) (“Any party oppos-
ing a motion for summary judgment must file with its responsive memorandum a statement 
in the form prescribed in (a), setting forth the specific facts which the opposing party asserts 
establishes a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment. Each fact must 
explicitly identify any fact(s) asserted by the moving party which the opposing party dis-
putes or clarifies. (E.g.: ‘Defendant’s fact #1: Contrary to plaintiff’s fact #1, . . .’)”). 
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writing opinions often miss important facts because they do not necessarily un-
derstand the legal significance of those facts. A recent study of plaintiff law-
yers’ briefs on both Rule 12 and Rule 56 suggested that there was considerable 
room for improvement.39 
II. CHANGES IN HOW DISTRICT JUDGES DECIDE CASES THAT  
MAKE INTEGRATION MORE DIFFICULT 
A. Bench Presence and Informal Decision Making 
One of the facets of district court judging is what has been called “bench 
presence,” a measure of the time that district judges spend adjudicating issues 
in an open forum.40 In two recent articles, Jordan Singer and Judge William 
Young argue, based on empirical data, that there has been a growing lack of 
bench time among federal trial judges.41 In response, Steve Gensler and Judge 
Lee Rosenthal suggest that increased judicial case management is tied more di-
rectly to summary judgment.42 Is it possible that the informal discussion in case 
management conferences is where some integration of law and fact is happen-
ing? 
The problem is that we do not know much detail on judicial case manage-
ment conferences and how they happen, specifically what different district 
judges do or don’t do. In any event, judicial case management meetings are 
more informal and likely to be random and piecemeal. 
B. Multiple Decision Makers 
In many cases, both district judges and magistrate judges may be involved 
in the same case. District judges may have magistrates monitoring discovery 
and sometimes dealing with other pretrial motions.43 There might also be a spe-
cial master or early neutral evaluator. Having multiple decision makers in-
volved in a case can be complicated. How can one magistrate judge monitor 
discovery and another judge decide formal motions? Sometimes the functions 
are separated, but sometimes they may be overlapping. 
                                                        
39  Scott A. Moss, (In)competence in Appellate and District Court Brief Writing on Rule 12 
and 56 Motions, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 841, 842–44 (2012–13). 
40  William G. Young & Jordan M. Singer, Bench Presence: Toward a More Complete Mod-
el of Federal District Court Productivity, 118 PENN ST. L. REV. 55, 58 (2013). 
41  Jordan M. Singer & William G. Young, Measuring Bench Presence: Federal District 
Judges in the Courtroom, 2008–2012, 118 PENN ST. L. REV. 243, 258–63 (2013); see also 
Young & Singer, supra note 40, at 56–59 (describing bench presence as a new mode of 
measurement and explaining the challenges, benefits, and opportunities for new research). 
42  Steven S. Gensler & Lee H. Rosenthal, Managing Summary Judgment, 43 LOY. U. CHI. 
L.J. 517, 518–19 (2012). 
43  R. Lawrence Dessem, The Role of the Federal Magistrate Judge in Civil Justice Reform, 
67 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 799, 802–03, 832–33 (1993). 
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The use of different decision makers and the delegation of these functions 
by district judges can be timesaving, but can also be confusing for lawyers, de-
cision makers, and litigants. Having multiple decision makers in one case can 
also impede efficient integration of fact and law. Information can “fall between 
stools.” This is a very different world of procedure than when cases were likely 
to go to trial, in which case one judge would have seen the case through all of 
its stages. 
C. No Oral Argument 
Now, commonly, district judges will not hold oral argument on most pre-
trial motions, including Rule 12(b)(6) motions and summary judgment. This is 
a change that was not true in the past. As every lawyer who practices civil liti-
gation in federal court knows, oral argument in both of these contexts is crucial. 
The whole case is at stake. It is where the lawyer and the judge can examine 
what is fact and what is law and explore that in the context of the specific case. 
It is where the judge can ask questions of the lawyers, hear answers, and probe 
more deeply into the heart of the case. In the absence of trial, oral argument 
would at least allow some narrative and focus on fact and law. 
Since there is likely no oral argument on summary judgment, this lack of 
narrative is a big problem. Subrin and Main argue in The Fourth Era that this is 
a big loss of procedural rights to hearing, legitimacy, and open court.44 Even 
Rosenthal and Gensler argue that the reason summary judgment needs to be 
“managed” is because of the absence of oral argument.45 The problematic com-
bination of lack of bench presence by judges and no oral argument means less 
possibility of direct dialogue and engagement between lawyers and the judge 
on fact and law. 
CONCLUSION 
The problem of lack of integration of fact and law in contemporary federal 
civil litigation lends additional support to the importance of Subrin and Main’s 
work. This problem has only worsened since they published their article, lead-
ing to even less opportunity for the development of a coherent picture of the 
case before a decision maker who must consider both fact and law. 
  
                                                        
44  Subrin & Main, supra note 2, at 1880–82. 
45  Gensler & Rosenthal, supra note 42, at 555–56. 
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